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atomistically competitive sectors such as farming. On The organization of this paper reflects that FM polthe other hand, wage and other contracts in impericy primarily impacts farm structure indirectly. The fectly competitive industries might cause prices charged immediate or first-round impact on the farming indusby firms in such industries to rise more slowly than try is primarily through cost-price, cash flow, real other prices. Inventories, biological restraints, supply wealth, and instability effects. I examine these firstand demand elasticities, and other factors also influround effects before analyzing their impacts on farm ence the relative and absolute response of prices by structure. The final section briefly reviews the influsector to an expansion in aggregate demand. Theory ence of federal tax policies on farm structure.
alone cannot predict relative price response by industry; the issue is empirical. The focus here is on the responsiveness of prices received and prices paid by FIRST-ROUND IMPACTS farmers to an increase in the general price level.
The conceptual framework was developed in a preFiscal policy and monetary policy working in convious study (Tweeten 1980a) relating farm prices to the cert have created an inflation cycle. Stimulating the general price level. My earlier empirical estimates inaggregate demand by increasing money supply and dicating that prices received by farmers change in profederal outlays and/or reducing taxes gives rise to the portion to the general price level are supported by other expansionary phase of the inflation cycle apparent in studies (see Gardner) . However, my earlier estimates increased employment, income, inflation, and net imshowing that prices paid by farmers change relatively ports. Contracting the aggregate demand by reducing more than the general price level are disputed by other money supply and federal spending and/or expanding studies (see Gardner) . To help resolve the issue, I here taxes creates the stabilization phase of the inflation present new estimates for the impact of inflation on cycle apparent in reduced employment, income, inflaprices paid. tion, and net imports. In general, imports of FM policy
The economic model is the input supply equation can be analyzed by phases of the inflation cycle feaspecified as turing these joint outcomes. Most of the subsequent analysis proceeds on that basis. However, in recent
(1) Pt = f(Q,, Ut, Ct, Mt, D,, PGt, PGt-,, .... ) years fiscal policy and monetary policy working at cross-purposes have produced mixed outcomes, comwhere plicating the analysis of impacts. Fiscal-monetary policy will be treated briefly on an ad hoc basis. Pt = Index of prices paid by farmers for producMuch of the following discussion is oriented to the tion inputs including interest, taxes, and expansion phase, but the arguments regarding costwage rates. The index of prices paid by price, cash flow, real wealth, and instability are largely farmers for items of nonfarm origin, PPt, symmetric for the stabilization phase-if disinflation available only for the 1965-81 period, was does not turn into deflation, pessimism into panic, and alternatively used as the dependent variable. recession into depression.
Q, = Index of aggregate farm production inputs.
U t = National unemployment rate.
(2) PG*t = go PGt + glAPGt Ct = Capacity utilization rate in U.S. manufac-= (go + g)PG -g PGt 1 . turing. Dt = Dummy variable; each year with a higher After inserting this expectation model for PGt and inflation rate than the previous year = 1, and PC t into equation (1) Council of Economic Advisors and the U.S. Department of Agriculture. All coefficients display expected signs. Judging by Inflation might impact on farm prices differently, the R 2 , insignificant autocorrelation coefficient in depending on whether inflationary pressures (valiequation (2a) and the magnitudes of the coefficients on dated by an increase in money supply) come from de-PG and PC, the specification of equation (2) is supemand-pull, cost-push, structural friction, or other rior to that of equation (1). A 1-percent increase in the sources. Accordingly, equation (1) includes the degeneral price level is associated with a 1.5-to 2.4-pergree of excess manufacturing capacity in the economy cent increase in prices paid by farmers in the short run as measured by C,, wage-price inflationary pressure as and by a 1.06-to 1.14-percent increase in the long run measured by Ut, and demand-led inflationary preswith elasticities computed at 1967 means. The coeffisures originating from an increase in money supply, Mt.
cients of PGt and PCt are significantly greater than 1.0. Coefficients of these variables were statistically insig-
The implied existence of a real farm-price impact of nificant, either singly or interacting with the general inflation in the short run but none in the long run is a price level, hence the variables were excluded in submore plausible result than that of equation (1). sequent empirical equations. The coefficients of Because Qt contributes to multicollinearity and bedummy variable D t and of another dummy variable alcause its coefficients were not significant in equation lowing for a change in the intercept for the last half of (2) and were much less significant in equations for the 1948-81 estimation period were also insignificant, shorter time periods, the input supply equation omitand the variables were removed from the equation.
ting Qt is shown for various time periods in Table 1 as The wage rate (along with U t to represent labor markets) and other prices, such as for energy, could be in- (1948-64) (1948-64) (1965-81) eral price level to prices paid by farmers produced the for differential short-run impacts of PG and PC on Pt.
Hence, the expectation of PG*, is expressed as a funcDouble asterisk denotes significance at .01 probability level.
tion of the level and change in PGt:
equations (3a)-(3-f). Coefficient signs and signifi- PGt and Pt/PC t ) as dependent to reduce multicollin-_____________________ earity. 2 R2's were lower, but interpretations were unchanged-inflation significantly raises real prices paid Additional equations were estimated to further explore the impact of multicollinearity and coefficient behavior under alternative lag structures (Table 2) .
1967 mean and shown in the last row of Table 1 , are Equations (4) and (5) were estimated by ordinary least not much different from the anticipated value of 1.0. squares, with respectively two and four general price Considering all plausible specifications and all time level variables. Equations were also estimated with a periods evaluated, no basis exists to reject the hypoththird degree polynomial and general price level lag of esis that inflation has a short-run real price impact on four years and of six years. The polynomial equation the farming industry through prices paid by farmers. results for the four-year lag were nearly identical to Even if prices paid by farmers increase more than the those from ordinary least squares equation (5), and general price level in the short run, the ratio of prices hence are not shown. Results of the third-degree polyreceived, P' to prices paid by farmers will not decline nomial with a six-year lag are shown in equation (6).
if P' is as responsive as P to general prices. In an earBased on signs and significance of regression and lier study (Tweeten 1980a) , I concluded that the elasfirst-order autocorrelation coefficients, results in Taticity of P' with respect to PG was not significantly ble 2 are inferior to those in Table 1 . However, the imdifferent from 1.0. Using coefficients from equations portant point is that a broad range of specifications (3a) or (3e), the implication is that each 1-percent insupport the conclusion that inflation increases real crease in PG reduces the parity ratio by 2.3 -1.0 = prices paid by farmers-all coefficients of PGt and PC, 1.3 percent in the short run. Equations using the conin Table 2 are significantly greater than 1.0.
sumer price index to measure the general price level All of the coefficients of PGt and PC, in equations give lower elasticity estimates of P with respect to PC. (2), (3a)-(3e), (4), (5), and (6) significantly exceed 1.0,
The elasticity of prices received P' with respect to PC indicating prices paid by farmers increase more than was not estimated in my earlier study, but would probthe general price level in the short run. The "overably be lower than the elasticity of P' with respect to reaction" to inflation is mostly offset after one year, PG and hence less than 1.0. The ratio of the two elasand most of the long-term elasticities, computed at the ticities might be similar to that between coefficients of I Correlation coefficients among interdependent variables are: .3603 2 The specification with Pt/PGt (or P,/PC,) and Q, dependent was also estimated jointly with an input demand equation by three-stage least squares. The coefficient of Q, in the input supply equation was insignificant, indicating no need for joint estimation of input price and quantity in a simultaneous system. (It may be noted that equations with deflated values Pt dependent also included deflated lagged values of the same variable as independent to form the distributed lag model.) PG, and PC, in Table 1 . Thus, estimates of inflation's "paper" profits difficult to confiscate in case of deimpact on the ratio P'/P might not be changed apprefault. Thus, inflation raises immediate costs and defers ciably by using PC rather than PG as a measure of the returns. general price level. Some of the specifications noted Cash flow influences investment. High rates of inearlier provide even larger values for the real price efflation tilt net cash flow toward large deficits in early fect of inflation on the farming industry.
years and large surpluses in later years of the farm firm Which estimate of the general price level, PG or PC, life cycle (Tweeten 1981 b) . This promotes high averis preferred? The advantage of PG, the implicit deflaage rates of savings and investment because it forces tor of GNP, is its comprehensive coverage of goods and high investment rates to survive in early years and enservices. The advantage of PC, the consumer price incourages high savings rates out of large discretionary dex, is that it, like P, is a modified Laspeyres index.
cash surplus in later years. Laspeyres indices overestimate general price changes in an inflationary economy. Biases are somewhat offReal Wealth Impacts setting in estimating the impact on P of PC but not of PG. However, both PG and PC indicate that inflation
In the past, farmers benefited greatly from inflation generates unfavorable short-run real price impacts on because they were net debtors who incurred long-term the farm economy.
interest obligations at rates well below the subsequent Other investigators found no evidence that inflation inflation rate. The requirement for such real wealth reduces real farm prices (see Gardner) . While I congains is that inflation be unanticipated by lenders, that sider my estimates convincing based on theoretical and long-term mortgages be contracted at fixed interest applied grounds, I will let more unbiased observers rates, and that farmers be net debtors. Future realjudge which results are most plausible.
wealth gains are unlikely to approach levels of the preFinally, it may be noted that a dummy variable al1980s. Creditors "burned" badly by real-wealth losses lowing different responses of farm prices to falling and in the past are unlikely to repeat their mistakes; they rising inflation rates had an insignificant coefficient, will lend either at high fixed interest rates or at flexible suggesting that responses of P are symmetric for rising rates tied to inflation. There is no reason to expect and falling general prices.
debtors to be any wiser than creditors in consistently anticipating future inflation and thereby accruing realCash-Flow Impacts wealth gains. A second source of real-wealth gains prior to 1980 I have elsewhere (Tweeten 1981b ) developed the was land earnings increasing faster than earnings on theory of the impact of inflation on cash flow in farmother investments. As owners of two-thirds of farming and will only briefly review the issue here. The land, farmers benefited massively not only from land fundamental theorem is that over time the current rate earnings but also from resulting real land price appreof return on a durable resource such as farmland is inciation. Since 1980, the situation has reversed with land variant to inflation. Empirical evidence supports this earnings and prices falling and farm owners incurring theory; the current rate of return on farmland has tended real-wealth losses. Real prices for farm output are exto average approximately 4 percent, whether the inflapected to increase somewhat from 1982 to 2000, raistion rate is high or low.
ing land earnings, land prices, and real wealth gains. Because real estate accounts for 80 percent of farm
The source of these increases will be mainly Marshalassets, the implication for farmers of this fundamental lian supply-demand factors, rather than government theorem is profound. If land earnings keep pace with fiscal-monetary policy. inflation, as they have historically (with some notable exceptions such as the early 1980s), and if land prices Instability Impacts average approximately 25 times earnings as in the past, then capital gain can be expected to compensate landFlexible interest rates increasingly used to cope with owners for inflation. The cash-flow problem arises bethe inflation cycle reduce chances for real-wealth cause capital gain is unrealized until land is sold, while transfers between debtor and creditor and, like flexible mortgage interest rates rather swiftly sum to the real rate exchange rates, reduce the incidence of major long-term of interest (about 3 percent) plus the premium for execonomic shocks to the farming economy. But like pected inflation. Thus, if no inflation is anticipated, the flexible exchange rates, flexible interest rates probacurrent farmland return of 4 percent and mortgage inbly increase short-term economic instability in farmterest at a similar rate create no cash-flow problem on ing. Short-term instability of interest rates is further a perpetual mortgage. But with expected inflation of 9 aggravated by the Federal Reserve Board policy, datpercent, the current return on farmland remains at 4 ing from October 1979, of attempting to stabilize percent, while mortgage interest rate rises to 3 + 9 = money supply rather than interest rates in the face of 12 percent, creating a cash-flow deficit of 12 -4 = fluctuating demand for money. Uncertainty about fu-8 percent of land values. A capital gain of 9 percent ture inflation rates raises long-term relative to shorteventually compensates so that returns of 4 + 9 = 13 term interest rates, encouraging use of short-term fipercent cover interest costs. In theory, landowners nancial capital and discouraging long-term capital incould borrow on capital gains to cover the cash-flow vestments. deficit, but creditors are hesitant to lend on uncertain Other costs of inflation and instability arising from the inflation cycle can be listed (Tweeten and Griffin) . the U.S. create high interest rates elsewhere, contribThe inflation cycle arbitrarily redistributes income and uting to a foreign financial crisis. Trade wars and prowealth, creating social friction. Real capital investtectionist policies also attend the poorly performing ments tend to be attractive in the expansion phase and U.S. and world economies. financial capital in the stabilization phase of the inflaEmpirical analysis indicates that farmers have a high tion cycle. Costs are incurred in shifting funds among propensity to invest out of transitory income, which is financial investments, real capital investments, and large in an unstable economic environment. Empirical cash balances. Taxes on nominal interest and capital models of the permanent income hypothesis applied to gains distort incentives. The optimal resource level and farming reveal that investment is greater with an unmix for given inflation expectations become suboptistable than with a stable income, other things being mal when actual inflation rates turn out to be different equal. An unstable economic environment generates than anticipated.
excess capacity in peak income and production peWhatever its intentions, the Federal Reserve has in riods, which remains underutilized in slack periods befact pursued an erratic policy, contributing to the incause it is specialized to agriculture. An unstable flation cycle by increasing money supply at a pace that economic environment requires resources for risk generates unacceptable inflation, then reducing money avoidance strategies, such as hedging, forecasting, disupply to generate unacceptable recession. The doversifying, storing, renegotiating contracts, revising mestic income effect of this inflation cycle on the farm prices, and managing liquidity, that would not be economy is less than in the past because of the low inneeded in a stable environment. come elasticity of demand for food, but is severe for
The net effect on resource use and efficiency of inthe beef sector, which supplies a product with a relaappropriate and unstable fiscal-monetary policy avertively high income elasticity of demand. Income of aged over inflation cycles can be judged only farmers is also affected by the inflation cycle because imperfectly. My conclusion is that instability reduces they depend increasingly on off-farm job earnings, economic efficiency (Tweeten 1979, Chapter 7) . Instawhich are buffeted by fluctuating employment opporbility may increase investment and aggregate input tunities through the inflation cycle.
volume, but may reduce output. Impacts of the inflation cycle are also influenced by growing international linkages. The expansion phase of the cycle is characterized by increasing imports and IMPLICATIONS FOR FARM SIZE decreasing exports induced by rising domestic income AND TYPE and prices relative to other countries. In time this trade imbalance may be redressed by a declining value of the The analysis now turns to implications of fical-mondollar in foreign exchange and by foreign economic etary policy for farm size and type through the costgrowth induced by economic growth in the U.S. Both price, cash flow, real wealth, instability, and other inof the latter force increases in U.S. exports.
termediaries discussed above. Future real-wealth Unfavorable fiscal-monetary policy may weaken the transfers may be small, hence they are omitted. The economic performance of nonfarm industries more than cost-price phenomenon primarily impacts on structure of the farming industry. The result may be a declining through instability, interacting with the inflation cycle value of the dollar in world markets, but a relative adto accentuate farm price instability. The following disvantage for U.S. agriculture, apparent in rising real cussion focuses primarily on the impact of instability farm prices and exports. Again the inflation cycle creand cash flow on farm structure with particular attenates instability through this linkage.
tion to competitive advantage of (1) entry-level versus If fiscal policy and monetary policy work at crossestablished farmers, (2) renters versus owner-operapurposes, as in the 1980s, other consequences of the tors, (3) industrial-conglomerate corporate farms verinflation cycle follow. A contractionary monetary polsus family farms, and (4) part-time versus full-time icy coupled with an expansionary fiscal policy makes operators. Each situation will be evaluated under fafederal government deficit financing a strong competvorable versus unfavorable fiscal-monetary policies itor for financial capital, driving up real estate interest with the former defined as one providing high employrates. Interest rates are also raised in an uncertain and ment and consistent economic growth under a stable unstable economic environment because financial capgeneral price level. ital suppliers demand a risk premium. Fear that the Federal Reserve will not hold to tight-money policy in Entry Versus Established Family Farmers the face of unemployment and large federal deficits creates expectations of future inflation that add to the In the past, a major advantage of the family farm has interest charge. High real interest rates retard investbeen its capacity to withstand economic instability. The ment, employment, and economic growth in the dofarm family did so by supplying a considerable portion mestic economy, while attracting financial capital from of farm equity, labor, and management resources. The abroad. The reduced supply of dollars abroad raises the family would survive economic adversity by "tightvalue of the dollar in foreign exchange, depressing farm ening its belt," accepting low returns to owned reand nonfarm U.S. exports. The weak U.S. economy sources, and foregoing expenditures while awaiting imports less and depresses foreign economies, which better times. With rising asset requirements and cash in turn import less from the U.S. High interest rates in costs for an economic size unit, the full-time family farm is less able to do so. Established farmers who have valued at opportunity costs. The number of small units accumulated considerable equity and a favorable debtoperated by able-bodied, full-time farmers has diminasset ratio can still do so, but not the highly leveraged ished sharply. Part-time small farms are economically beginning farmer faced with the cash-flow squeeze enviable and growing in numbers. Many families value gendered by inflationary fiscal-monetary policy. High highly the farm way of life and are willing to pay for inflation does not affect farm firm growth substanthis consumption preference by subsidizing small farm tially, but severely impairs entry of prospective fullresidency out of nonfarm income. These consumptive time family farmers (Eginton and Tweeten) . As estabpart-time small farmers can cope with cash-flow and lished family farmers compete effectively against proinstability problems by using nonfarm income to supspective family farmers for opportunities, farm plement farm income. They are further encouraged by structure is tilted to larger, fewer units in an unfavortaxation policies and subsidized rural community serable macroeconomic policy environment, vices to be farm residents. Surveys indicate that parttime farming is a widely perferred "permanent" activRenters Versus Owner-Operators ity; such farmers for the most part are positioning
Cash-flow problems in agriculture arise primarily themselves neither to become full-time farmers nor to from buying land. With a given equity, an operator can become nonfarm residents. Life-cycle historic data withstand cash-flow and instability problems arising from a survey in Oklahoma suggest that small farm opfrom unfavorable fiscal-monetary policies or other erators started small, and full-time commercial farm sources better as a renter rather than an owner. An aboperators started somewhat large. Thus, part-time small sentee landlord servicing a mortgage out of a medical farms and full-time large family farms seem to be practice or other nonfarm income can deal with cash somewhat distinct entities with relatively few crossflow and instability problems more readily than can a overs between the two. Given the barriers to new fullflow and instability problems more readily than can a full-time farm owner-operator depending on the farm time operations, the desire for farm residence, and the for income. It follows that unfavorable fiscal-monesuccess of part-time small farmers in coping with cashfor income. It follows that unfavorable fiscal-moneflow and instability problems associated with unfavortary policy tilts land ownership to absentee landlords flo an instability problems associated with unfavorand to farm operator tenancy and part-ownership. A able fiscal-monetary policy, the number of part-time decrease in the proportion of farmland owned by farm small farms i expected to increase relative to full-time operators is expected.
family farm operations.
Corporate Industrial-Conglomerate Versus Family Farms TAX POLICY
Farms with diversified sources of farm and nonfarm This paper has emphasized federal fiscal-monetary income and debt and equity capital can withstand cashpolicy as it affects aggregate demand and general price flow and instability problems better than can full-time level. The specific form of federal spending and taxing family farmers who depend on farm income. The corpolicies also affects structure. Federal income and esporate conglomerate avoids the life cycle financial tate taxes appear to influence farm structure much more problems of the family farm. Ever larger asset and cash than other major programs, such as federal credit and cost requirements per dollar of farm output coupled commodity programs. with marketing economies on larger operations and Other things equal, progressive income and estate advantages of highly sophisticated technology (e.g. taxes would discourage growth of large farms. Other computers) and risk management strategies also make things are not equal, however. Progressivity of federal conglomerate farms effective competitors with family taxes has been offset by tax credits and deductions over farms. A chief advantage of family farmers-devoted, considerable income ranges (Sisson) . A central feature high-quality operational management and husbandry of income tax credits and deductions is that they subcoupled with willingness to temporarily postpone considize capital, while payroll taxes increase costs of lasumption or accept lower average real return on owned bor-thus the tax system encourages substitution of resources over time-is probably relatively less imcapital for labor (Boehlje; Davenport, et al.; Eginton) . portant now than in the past for survival. Coping with Tax deductions interact with inflation and income, the inflation cycle has hastened the development of sogiving a comparative advantage in bidding for farm rephisticated risk management strategies and negotiated sources to investors with high incomes. With land the or administered pricing in agriculture characterized by major capital input in farming, the implication is that economies for large farm firms. Thus unfavorable fisfederal income taxes bring about larger, fewer farms. cal-monetary policy abets the trend to market concenTax laws encourage expansion of individual farm firms tration and away from atomistic competition. Although and exert upward pressure on land prices, creating barthe pace of conglomerate encroachment into farming riers to farm entry. will probably be slow at any rate, unfavorable fiscalRecent federal tax law has essentially removed esmonetary policy quickens the pace. tate taxes on transfer of an economic size farming unit Part-time Versus Full-time Operators among generations. Based on simulations of a typical commercial Oklahoma farm, if an owner-operator with Small farming operations produce less efficiently on minimum initial equity died after 30 years of farming, the average than larger farms, when all resources are he could leave double his initial real equity to each of two heirs, along with a lifetime annuity to his spouse nology (Tweeten 1980b, p. 117) . Farms must grow in (Eginton) . If each of the two heirs had spouses who rescale for farm income to keep pace with rising income ceived similar inheritance, the implications for accuof nonfarmers. Favorable fiscal-monetary policy causes mulation of farm assets among generations and eventual income and technology growth, resulting in fewer, growth into larger-than-family-size farms is apparent.
larger farms. Thus there may be fewer farms on the avMany federal tax provisions are available only in farmerage with favorable fiscal-monetary policy, but the ing and have the greatest value for persons with high impact of unfavorable policy is to push the composiwealth and income, thus tilting farm structure in the tion of those farms away from the family ideal of fullsame direction as the unfavorable fiscal-monetary poltime owner-operator units that allow the family to make icy discussed above. Tax laws especially disadvantage most of the decisions and supply most of the labor and potential young operators who are not sons or sons-inequity capital. law of established operators.
The behavioral responses of aggregate farm structure to federal fiscal-monetary policy have not been CONCLUSIONS quantified, necessitating a treatment herein largely based on deductive logic. The logic receives support Unfavorable fiscal-monetary policy tilts comparafrom several sources. One is quantification in studies tive advantage to (1) established family farms, (2) using deterministic rather than behavioral models of renters, including part owners, (3) corporate industypical farm firms under various tax policy and inflatrial-conglomerate farms, and (4) part-time small tion scenarios (Boehlje; Davenport, et al.; Eginton) . If farms. The gains in these categories are associated with individuals act rationally to increase after-tax income, a decline in entry-level full-time family farms-which these models help to predict actual outcomes. Also, eventually means fewer full-time family size farms.
actual observed movement of the farming economy in Land ownership and operation will be increasingly the direction predicted herein provides at least circumseparated, with ownership tilting toward nonfarm abstantial evidence in support for the conclusions of this sentee landlords and corporate stockholders. Unfavoranalysis. able fiscal-monetary policy also appears to increase I have elsewhere (Tweeten 1981a ) detailed needed capital-labor ratios and possibly investment, while rechanges in federal policy to restore economic vigor with ducing overall economic efficiency.
price stability. Space limitations here preclude spellHigh real interest rates and a depressed economy ing out such a policy, but important elements include promoted by expansionary fiscal policy and tight
(1) internationally coordinated fiscal-monetary policy, money policy in the early 1980s may have been the (2) decisive action to ensure a more nearly balanced worst of all environments for the mid-size family farm, post-recession federal budget, and (3) restructuring the but favorable fiscal-monetary policy is also no unmiteconomy to create resiliency and reduce the natural rate igated boon to farm structure. The two major factors of unemployment through a wage supplement and andetermining farm size are personal income and techtitrust legislation applied to organized labor.
